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STATE OP NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF CA YUGA 
In the Mnttet of lhe Application of 
JERRY LAMPHERE (#07-B-1440), 
Petitioner, 
rNDEXNO. 2011-1010 
·VS• 
NYS DIVISION OF PAROLE, 
Respondent. 
For a Judgment pursuant to Article 78 of tl1e 
Civil Praclicc Lnw and Rules 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
HON. MARK H. FANDRICH 
Acting Supreme Court Justice 
Cayuga County 
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ESQ. 
Attomey (}enerol of the State of New York 
By: RAY A. KYLES, ESQ. 
As.sisUIJlt Anomey General of Counsel 
615 Erie Boulevard West, Suite 102 
Syracuse, New York 13204 
JERRY LAMPHERE (#07-B- 1440), Petitioner, Pro Se 
Cayuga Correctional Facility 
PO Box 1186 
Moravia, New York 13118 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Pi\J'lclrich, Mork H., Acting}. 
Petitioner, who is presently an inmate at Cayuga Correctional Facility, is challenging the New 
York State Di vision of Parole's de term inatiQn denying bis request for release on parole and directing 
t11athe beheld for an additional 24 months. Pctilionercommenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR 
Article 78 requesting that the Coll rt reverse and set aside Respondent's determination of March 23, 
2011. He argues, nmong other thing!i, !hat the decision wns improperly based on the nature of ~e 
crimo and was made without considerntion of Petitioner's receipt of an earned efigibility certificate. 
Petitioner was convicted, following a plea of guilty, of Manslaughter in the Second Degree, 
Driving WJtile 1ntox.icnted and Endangeri11g the Welfa.re of a Child. He was sentenced on April 24, 
2007, to a tem1 of incarceration of five to ten years for the Manslaughter u1 the Second Degree 
charge and one year each for the Driving While Cntoxicated and EndWlgcring the Welfare of a Child 
charges, .to run concurrently with the Manslaughter charge. Petitioner's arrest and subsequent 
convict.ion stemmed from the death of his four-year-old daughtel' in a motor vehicle crash in which 
Petitioner was the driver. Al the time of the incident, Petitioner was driving under the influence of 
alcohoi a.ad traveling at an excessive rate of speed for conditions (sec Respondent's Verified A.n8Wer 
and Return, Exhibit B). Petitioner was nlso on probalio~t lb(;! tirnc Qfp~ arrest for thh incideQ!. 
This was Petitioner's first appearance before the Parole Board. On Morch 23, 2011, the Board 
denied Petitioner parole and ordered him held for unother 24 months. The Parole Board decision 
stated as follows: 
''Denied - hold for 24 montJ1s. Next appearance date: 03/2013. Notwithstanding the EEC, 
after a review of the record and interview, the panel has detennined that if released at this time, there 
is a reasonable probability that you would oot live 1111d remain nt liberty without again violating the 
law nnd your release would be incompatible with the welfare of society. Th.is decision is based on 
the: following factors: your instant offense Manslauglrter 2nc1 for which you are serving 5-10 years. 
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Your crime involved you causing the death of your 4 year old daughter. You also endangered the life 
of your 7 year old child. Your crime occu1Ted while you were driving in an intoxicated condition. 
You were tmder parole supervision at the time for criminal contempt of coui1. These crimes are a 
:;cvere escalation and continuation of a past panem of out of control conduct. You were wideterred 
by prior court intervention and have done poorly under community supervision. Tite Board notes 
your positive programming accomplishments. All factors considered, your release at this time is not 
warranted." 
Petitioner filed and perfected nn administrative appeal. While the actual date is unclear to the Court, 
il appellIS lllat the Administrative Appell! Decision Notice was issued on or nbout August JS, 2011, 
nffinning the Pa.role Board's decision. 
InJt.inlly, subsequent to lhe filing of his pctilion, Petitioner raised Uie issue that the recent 
changes lo the Executive Law should be applied retroactively to him. In 2011, Executive Law §259-
c(4) was amended to include language thut the Parole Board Is to establish written procedures for 
its use in making parole decisions (see 12011, c. 62, pt. C, subpt. A, §38-b). As part of the same bill, 
Executive Law §259-i was also amended to repeal Executive Law §259-i(l) and to place all of the 
factors that the Parole Board is required to consider in Executive Law ~259-i (2)(c). Previously, two 
of the factors that the Board was to consider were listed under executive Law §259-i(l), while the 
others were listed under ExccutiveLaw§259-i (2)(c). Under tho2011 amendments, all of the factors 
arc now listed tmder Executive Lnw §259-i (2)(c). 
Petitioner's parole hearing was held prior to October I, 2011, the effective date of the 
amendments to Executive Law §259-c(4). This Court h~s prc:viously held that the amendments to 
Executive Law §259 -c( 4) should nol be appl!~cl. retl'oactively and sees no reason to disturb its prior 
. ... . . . ... ·- . .. ., ... . . 
holding (see Matier of Sattan v. Evans, Sop Ct1 Cayuga County, January 23, 2012, Fandrich, J., 
-- . .. ........... .... ""'".... . . ·~ ... -. ~ . , ,,-..; ·-·· · . . -
index No.2011-0594). As a result, the amendments to Executive Law §259-c(4) do not apply to the 
instant proce(;diog. With regard to the amendments to E?tccutivc Law §259-i(2)(c), the amendments 
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do no1 add any new factors to be considerec!, but merely reorgMize the factors, making them easier 
to follow, As a re.suit, the factors for the Board to consider in determining whether Petitioner should 
be released to p11rofe are the same whether under the former version ofExecutive Law §259-i or the 
cnrrent one. 
It is well settled U1at there is no inherent constitutional right to parole (see Matier of Rus;o 
v. New .York Sra1e. Board of Parole, 50 NY2d 69 (I 980)). "(!Jhe Board of Parole is vested with an · 
extraordinary degree of responsibility in determining who will go free and who will remain in 
prison" such that dccisiomfregarding release on p11Iole arc clearly discretionary (Marr er of Garcia 
v. New York State Division of Parofe,239 AD2d 235 (1 11 Dept1997)). As a result, the parole system 
hol<l:i out no more than the possibility of parole (.ree Russo, 50 NY2d at 75). · 
Pursuant to statute, the actions of the }'arole Board are deemed a judicial function and are not 
reviewable if done in accordance with Jaw (Executive Law §259-i(S)). Judicial intervention js · 
warranted only when there is a showing of "inationality bordering on impropriety" (Matter of 
'Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470 (2000), quoting Ru:;so, 50 NY2d at 77 (1980)). In the absence .of a 
"convincing demonstration to the contrary," the Board is p~sumed to have acted properly in 
accordance with sta.totory requirements (see Malter of Zane v. 1'ravis, 23 J AD2d 848 (4th Dept 
1996)/ Matier Qj Mclain v. New York State Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456 (2d Dept 1994)). 
r.n determining whether the Board acted properly, the Court m'U.9t look at the statutory 
standards governing discretionary release to parole supervision. Such stnndards are set forth in 
Executive Law 259-i[2]f c], which states, fo pertineut part: 
Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for good · 
conclnct or efficient performaoce of duties wh.i le confined but after considering 
if there is a rl!asonablc probability. that, if such inmate is released, he will live 
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and remrun at liberty without violating the law, and that his release is not in-
compatible with the welfare of society 1md "viii not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for Jnw. 
Iii every case, the Board must consjder, in sum, the inmale's instilutional record, performance, if any, 
as a participant in a temporary ix:Jease program, release plnns, an)' deportation order issued by the 
federal govenunent, any ""'.rit1en statements of the crime victim or his or her representative, lhe 
seriousness of the offense and the fnmnte's prior criminal record (Executive Law. 259·i(2J(c}(A)). 
The burden is on the Petitioner to convince the Court that he is entitled to relief (.;ee Matter 
of Galbreflh v. New York State Board of Parole, 58 AD3d 731 (2d Dc.1Jt 2009)). Petitioner in the 
inst.ant case has not dono so. Contrary lo Petitioner's claim, the re-0ord reveals thal the Parole Board 
properly considered the relcvllJlt statutory factors in making its decision. The Board discussed 
Petitioner's positive accomplishments, good disciplinary record and other nchievernents with him, 
including his receipt of an earned eligibility certificate (see eg Maller of Reed v. E'vans, _AD3d _, 
2012 NY Slip Op 2936 [3d Depl 2012}; Moller u[Hafl v. New York Slatf! Division of Parole, 66 
AD3d 1322 {3d Dept 2009)). The decision was sufficiently detailed to intbrm the Petitioner of the 
reasons for the denial of pnrole and it satisfied the requirements of Exec. Law 259~i[2J[a] (see 
fJ'hiteheadv. Kuss/, 201AD2d825 (3d Depl 1994)), 
Th~ Parole Board need not articulate or expressly discuss each factor it considered in 
rendering its determination (see Ek v. New York State Board of Parole, 301 AD2d 433 (3rd Dept. 
2003)). That the Paro1e Bonrd may have given greater weight to the nature of the offense than to 
Petitioner's achievements while incarcerated does not render the decision to deny parole arbitrary 
and capriclow (see f!g Mattf!r of Garofolo v, Dennison, 53 AD3d 734 (3d Dept 2008); Mmter of 
Gasrnri v. JJer/Jary, 16 AD3d l 158 (41h Dept 2005)). The Parole Board is not required to give all of 
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the statutol'y fac:tors equal weight in con~ldering lin inmate's opplication for )>a.role (see eg Maller 
of Barnes v. New York Sr ate Dfvlsion of Parole, 53 AD3d { 0 12 (3d Dept 2008)). \Vhilc Petitioner 
insists that the offense is legally classified as an "accident," this is not merely a civil maller. 
Petitioner's actions of driving while intoxicated and nt an excessive rate of speed, causing the death 
of his daughter, was a reckless act and one which,. as Petitioner is well aware, carried serious 
criminal r11mifications. The Parole Board was required to consider the serious nature of the crimes 
as well as Petitioner's criminal history in making its detem1inn1ion and propedy did so here (see cg 
Maller of Hawkins v. Travis, 259 AD2d 813 (3d Dept 1999), Iv dt:nied93 NY2d 1033 (I 999)). 
In nddi1ion, the CoW1 disagrees with Petitioner's contention that because he received en 
earned ~ligibility certificate, he must be released to parole. l'urSuant to Cprrection Law §805, an 
eligible irunatc who ha·s been issued an earned eligibility certificate "shall be granted parole release 
at the expiration of his minimum term . .. unless the board of parole determines that there is a 
reasonable probabilitY that, if such inmate Lt released, he will nol live and remain ar /iberly without 
violating rhe law (Ind that his relea.i·e is nor compatible wifh the welfare of soc/et;/' (Correction Law 
§805 (emphasis addt:d)). Although Petitioner rticeived an earned etigil>ility certificate, he is not 
uutomntically c11titlect to discretionary parole release (see Matter of Dorrrtan v. New Yor~ State Board 
uf Parole, 30 AD3d 880 (3d Dept 2006); Maller of Pearl v. New York Slate Division of Paro/11, 25 
A03d I 058 (3d Dept 2006)). It ;vas within tlie Bo1trd's purview to conclude that release of Petitioner 
would be incompatible with the welfare of society, despite Petitioners receipt of an eamed eligibility 
ce11i ficatc (see eg Matter of Vinesld v. Travis, 244 AD2d 737 (3d Dept 1997), Iv denied 91 NY2d 
809 ( 1998)). 
Finally, Respondent has submitted for the Court's in-camera review Petitioner's pre-sentence 
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repon and parts II and m of the inmate status report. The C()Urt has reviewed said documents and 
has considered them in ma.king its determinalion here. The Court agrees with Respondent that 
Petitioner is not entitled to copies of said documents. 
The Court has considered Petitioner's remaining contentions and finds tJ:iem to be without 
merit. As a result of the above, tl1e Court finds chc decision oflhe Parole Board was not irrational, 
in violation of lawful procedure, affected by an error oflaw, or arbitrary or capricious. The petition 
must therefore li1: denied. 
Accordiugly, based UPQU the foregoing, it is ht:rcby 
ORDERED that the petition is denied on its merits and the proceeding is dismissed. 
All documents submitted to the Court for in camera review are to be returned to counsel for 
Respondent; all other papers are to be filed by the Courl with the County Clerk. 
This constitutes the Decision nnd Orl1dr , f 'he Cot1 t./.\ 1 . / ~ I ·r:1 lr1. ) I I I! /. , 
Datcd:,=f..Bil .,(.I 2012 w\. t · .-fd/11yJi11.t/1 
Ho . Mark H. Fandrich 
Acting Supreme Court Justice, Cayuga Co. 
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